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Abstract  This paper expounds an exploratory study on 
the connections between Amartya Sen’s capability approach 
and epistemic proceduralism focused on the measurement of 
poverty. The study describes the general features of Sen’s 
approach and then analyses them from the perspective of 
epistemic proceduralism. Some difficulties were observed in 
the deliberative concept of democracy and the process of 
devising lists and consensuses to design tools for poverty 
measurement. We proved that the strongest link between the 
capability approach and epistemic proceduralism lies in the 
theoretical level. Therefore, whoever studies poverty and 
social needs has to cope with the challenge of applying the 
ideal of deliberative democracy to the definition of needs or 
lists of capabilities and provide arguments to ground rights. 
Keywords  Poverty, Capability Approach, Democracy, 
Epistemic Proceduralism, Measuring Instruments 
1. Introduction
It proves impossible to ignore the impact caused by 
Amartya Sen’s capability approach on the theoretical and 
methodological levels in studies of poverty. Understanding 
poverty as a deprivation of capabilities spelt a conceptual 
fracture. It introduced a notion that focused on the agent and 
on each person’s freedom to lead the life he values. It 
questioned the standard strategy of prescribing a list of 
“necessary” goods. Sen has held that if measuring 
instruments are to be deemed legitimate, processes of 
selection such as those involved in creating lists of valuable 
points must involve the practice of reasoning that should 
follow democratic procedures. 
In connection with this, several authors who endorse 
deliberative approaches to democracy hold that deliberative 
processes involve cognitive virtues. This notion is known as 
epistemic proceduralism. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyse the connection between the capability approach and 
epistemic proceduralism. It hopes to explore a line of 
research that has not been sufficiently developed yet. It aims 
to grant legitimacy to instruments of measurement, involving 
various agents (and not exclusively experts). It also expects 
legitimacy will not rest exclusively on the process; rather it 
should focus on the cognitive extra feature that may result 
from public debate. 
Consequently, the process will be as follows: first it will 
sketch out the general features of the capability approach. 
After that, the capability approach will be analysed under the 
light of epistemic proceduralism, identifying features or 
reasons that may account for a link between Sen’s work and 
the deliberative conception of democracy. Lastly, I will point 
at some concerns that arise in the deliberative concept of 
democracy as well as in the process of consensus building 
around the valued-valuable when devising instruments to 
measure poverty. Despite these difficulties, I believe the 
proposal is promising. 
2. A Characterisation of the Capabilities
Approach
Poverty as Capabilities Deprivation 
The conceptual break1 brought about by the capability 
approach in the definition of poverty is linked to the 
emergence of a new strategy in the evaluation of wellbeing. 
Such strategy focuses on the possibilities for action enabled 
by the possession of goods. Within this framework, freedom 
holds a privileged position in the definition of welfare. The 
notion of capabilities lies between the subjectivity of 
preferences and the objectivity of needs, witnessing to the 
1 It is relevant to clarify that when we state that the introduction of the 
notion of capabilities caused a conceptual break, in no way are we limiting 
this type of processes to the belief that one individual author is able to 
introduce new meanings in the language of a particular period in history. 
Rather, we are inclined to hold the need to think about the contexts of debate 
and the premises shared with the members of the community involved, 
concepts that open interactive processes between opposite stances that 
provide the necessary framework for certain conceptual transformations to 
become viable. 
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freedom a person has to develop the kind of life he values. 
Consequently, the value of a life style depends on the 
freedom to choose it enjoyed by the agent. 
The basic notions of Sen’s approach are functionings and 
capabilities: the former are a person’s states and actions, 
while capabilities are the various combinations of 
functionings that a person can attain. Achievements identify 
valuable objects, while capabilities determine the value each 
person allots to the entire set of such achievements (Sen, 
1997). 
An individual’s capabilities and functionings are 
interrelated but they differ. Functionings are achievements, 
while a capability is the ability to accomplish it. The 
connexion between functionings and life conditions is more 
direct that is the case with capabilities, which are linked to 
the notion of freedom. Conditions involve processes that 
ensure freedom of action and decision as well as the 
opportunities enjoyed by individuals in view of their 
personal and social circumstances. From such perspective, 
knowing which goods a person owns or may use is not 
enough to know which functionings he may attain. 
Consequently, it is necessary to have a much fuller 
knowledge about the individual and his life circumstances in 
order to determine what capabilities and functionings he may 
achieve. 
The capability approach does not consider the 
functionings a person has achieved as the ultimate normative 
measure. Interest is focused on people’s freedoms, that is, on 
their capability to function and on the levels of functionings 
attained.  
The process of conceptual change we mentioned above 
implied a greater complexity in the interpretation of goods. 
In Sen’s view, a large number of personal and social factors 
are at play between goods and what can be achieved with 
them. This results in significant differences in the final result 
between the achievements of various individuals. From 
Sen’s perspective, the main feature of welfare is what a 
person can “achieve”, broadly understood. When discussing 
achievements, Sen mentions “several ways of doings and 
being” (Sen, 1997: 77). They may be activities or states of 
existence or of being. Among the former, we find: eating, 
reading, seeing; among the latter, situations as being well 
nourished, enjoying good health, not feeling ashamed of the 
clothes worn, etc. The central point is that people should be 
free to develop the type of life they wish. Development and 
wellbeing are analysed in a comprehensive and integral way; 
attention is paid to the connections between material, mental 
and spiritual wellbeing, as well as the economic, social, 
political and cultural dimensions of life. 
Sen’s proposal aims at devising instruments to assess 
individuals’ quality of life without falling into reductionisms 
by sticking to material resources or welfare. That is why his 
approach takes both functionings and capabilities into 
account. It is worth mentioning that functionings display the 
situation people are actually experiencing, what they are, 
what they can or cannot do, and their rights are connected 
along this line. A person’s capability is given by the number 
of alternative vectors of functioning modes he/she might 
achieve; in other words, that person’s possible development 
alternatives connected to freedom in a positive sense. 
Whereas capabilities, in the plural, refer to particular 
functionings potentially attainable by an individual, such as 
the capability to enjoy good health, a good education, being 
well nourished and the rights associated with them. 
In Sen’s view, poverty must be conceived as capability 
deprivation. Being deprived is not tantamount to lack of 
capabilities. When Sen discusses capability deprivation, he 
thinks of the suspension of people’s potentials, the 
suspension of certain capabilities that are present but cannot 
flourish or develop on account of various conditioning 
factors to which individuals are submitted: disease, scarce or 
non-existent income, unemployment or lack of education, 
among others. 
Along the same line, Sen focuses on the importance of 
certain liberties in the enhancement of people’s lives. 
Conspicuous among them are basic capabilities: avoiding 
situations of undernourishment, preventable morbidity, and 
premature mortality. Also, freedoms connected with the 
capacity of expression, reading, writing, calculation or active 
participation in politics (Sen, 2000). 
Consequently, these elementary capabilities and the 
freedoms associated with them are not merely instrumentally 
important. Their relevance does not lie on the fact that their 
absence would curtail other achievements, but on the fact 
that they are constitutive to development. “Considerable 
attention must be paid to social factors, including State 
interventions, which contribute to determine the nature and 
reach of individual freedoms. Social institutions can make a 
crucial contribution to guarantee and increase the freedoms 
of individuals’ (Sen, 2000: 61). 
The passage quoted denotes that, in Sen’s opinion, 
individual capabilities largely depend on economic, social 
and political systems. Following the line of his argument, 
individuals must be seen as agents who actively participate in 
the design of their own lives if they have the necessary 
opportunities to do so. Such opportunities are not alien to the 
role played by the State, institutions and society in protecting 
and strengthening human capabilities. “Their role is to help, 
not to provide something ready-made” (Sen, 2000: 75). 
In this sense, in the analysis of poverty, the 
capability perspective contributes to a better 
understanding of the nature and causes of poverty 
and deprivation by shifting the core of attention 
from the means (and a particular means that 
usually gets exclusive attention: income) to the 
ends that individuals have reasons to pursue and, 
consequently, to the freedoms that are necessary to 
accomplish those ends (Sen, 2000: 117). 
The connection between income poverty / capabilities 
poverty is given by the fact that income is a means to achieve 
capabilities, but increasing income is not the end to which 
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policies aimed at reducing poverty should be directed. 
Consequently, in Sen’s opinion, assessment processes should 
focus on fundamental freedoms. Since the purpose is to 
focus on the individual’s opportunities to achieve his aims, it 
is important to take into account the goods agents have at 
their disposal as well as the personal features that contribute 
to determine the process of converting goods into 
achievements. Illness or advanced age may seriously 
undermine the chances of leading a normal life, even when 
the number of goods owned is larger compared to those of a 
young and healthy person. 
This is where, according to Sen, the notion of 
functionings/achievements becomes important since it 
shows “the things a person may value doing or being” (Sen, 
2000: 99). Valuable achievements cover a wide range that 
goes from elementary things such as eating or not enduring 
avoidable illnesses, up to activities or personal states such as 
self-respect or participating in communal activities. “A 
person’s capability refers to the various combinations of 
functionings he may achieve… it is a type of freedom: the 
basic freedom to achieve different combinations of 
functionings” (Sen, 2000: 99-100). It means the freedom to 
choose the life-style one wishes to lead. 
From this perspective, analysis may focus on the 
functionings achieved, viz. what the person effectively 
managed to achieve, or on the set of capabilities, options and 
opportunities available for any individual. Consequently, the 
approach offers the possibility of achieving two kinds of 
information: about the things a person does and those he has 
the freedom to do. 
3. The Process of Drawing Lists of 
Capabilities 
Besides introducing a new notion that focused on the agent 
and each person’s freedom to lead the life he values, Sen 
questioned the customary strategy of prescribing a list of 
needs, goods or, in the case of his approach, capabilities. The 
term “prescription” is not trivial and somehow anticipates 
the importance Sen grants to the process of selecting a list of 
capabilities. Precisely, one of the main virtues he grants to 
the approach is the fact that it is open: he believes openness 
contributes to bring arguments, presuppositions and criteria 
to the fore around the definition of functionings and 
capabilities that should be included in a list. In this way, he 
rejects the practice of adopting an “implicit model” that 
conceals them. Sen questions the reification or fetishization 
of a list that may be adapted to different contexts, overrating 
the instrument above the context and the subjects on whom it 
is applied. 
Sen grants crucial importance to the process of choice and 
the freedom of thought implied in the selection of relevant 
capabilities. From his perspective, it is necessary to follow 
democratic processes; consequently, prescribing a list would 
go against one of the principles of his approach, namely, the 
need to expand freedoms (Sen, 2000). 
Resuming Sen’s words, assessments like those involved in 
poverty studies require “some kind of reasoned ‘consensus’ 
on weighting or at least on a range of weightings” because 
they are exercises of social choice that require “a public 
debate and democratic understanding and acceptance” (Sen, 
2000: 104). 
This leads him to state there is some tension between the 
various strategies used to select weightings. He stresses the 
need to explicitly ascribe value weightings to the different 
components of the quality of life and discuss the weightings 
chosen in public debates and critical scrutiny. 
There […]is an interesting option between 
“technocracy” and “democracy” in the selection of 
weightings […]. A selection procedure based on a 
democratic search for an agreement or a consensus 
may prove extraordinarily cumbersome and many 
technocrats are sufficiently disgusted with its 
complexity as to yearn for some magic formula 
that will simply provide us with ready-made 
weightings that will prove “perfect”. Obviously, 
however, there is no such magic formula because 
weighting involves evaluation and valuing: it is not 
an issue of impersonal technology (Sen, 2000: 
104). 
In fact, according to Sen, people’s values must be taken 
into account to establish which accomplishments must be 
included in a list. Pulling down disciplinary chasms, Sen 
holds that studying cultural processes may contribute to 
understand guidelines of behaviour, social capital and 
economic success. Values are passed down, and culture, in 
his opinion, is a dynamic construction that includes actions 
of emulation and imitation. Therefore, it is imperative to 
study the process of value formation and transformation, 
analysing how they are modified and connected to other 
values and cultures (Álvarez, 2008). 
Consequently, though there may be a consensus about the 
capabilities to be included in a list, when it comes to 
comparing between individuals and devising policies, it is 
crucial to take into account how people value functionings 
and prioritize consensual accomplishments.  
(…) if prior to any evaluation it is essential …. to 
carry out a documented public scrutiny, implicit 
values must be described more explicitly instead of 
protecting them from scrutiny with the spurious 
excuse that they are part and parcel of an “already 
standing” measure that society may use with no 
previous analysis (Sen, 2000: 106). 
The crucial point is to assess if some evaluations 
may apply or refrain from applying some criteria 
that have a greater support in public opinion than 
the sole indicators usually recommended for 
allegedly technological reasons –such as real 
income indicators. This proves essential when 
economic and social policy must be evaluated (Sen, 
2000: 107). 
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Precisely this search for criteria backed by public opinion 
takes us back to deliberative views of democracy, and more 
specifically, to epistemic proceduralism. In what follows, we 
will describe the general features of that approach. After that, 
we will go through Sen’s work in search of components that 
might allow us to articulate his proposal with lines of thought 
that attribute cognitive value to deliberative procedures. 
4. Epistemic Proceduralism and 
Definition of Capabilities 
The epistemic value of democratic procedures is one of the 
tenets shared by authors who uphold deliberative approaches 
to democracy (Gutmannand Thompson, 1996; Nino, 1997; 
Barber, 2004; Habermas 2009; Estlund, 2011).  
To date, there is no monolithic theory about the meaning 
of the deliberative democracy ideal. Having said that, in the 
present section we will propose some ideas that may help us 
to understand the notion of deliberative democracy and the 
grounding of the epistemic value attributed to it. 
Deliberative approaches presume that decision-making 
must be principally based on deliberation. At the same time, 
they share an anti-elite concept of democracy: this implies 
rejecting the belief that one group of people may be better 
trained than others to decide impartially in the name of all 
others. From their perspective, the logics of politics differ 
from that of the market, where individuals choose courses of 
action according to how they feel individually touched by 
their decisions. 
Supporters of the epistemic character of democracy hold 
that citizens trust the democratic process of decision making, 
not only because they deem it more just but also more correct. 
Along this line, they believe that these processes create a 
collective action dynamics, characterised by a greater 
tendency to prefer impartial decisions. This distinguishes 
them form other alternative decision- making processes 
(Gargarella, 1995; Estlund, 2011). Such dynamics is 
generated by the participation of every citizen in the debate, 
where each one has an equal chance to inform the others 
about his interests. In addition, any decision that is forwarded 
must be justified. 
There are differences among thinkers who hold a 
deliberative perspective of democracy about the criterion on 
which they base epistemic value. While for some it is 
participation (Barber, 2004; Nino, 1997; Fung and Wright, 
2003) and they judge that when more individuals participate 
in deliberative processes the chances to arrive to the truth are 
higher. For others, correct decisions do not depend on the 
number of participants in discussions, but on the conditions 
under which they are carried out (Habermas, 2008 in 
Habermas 2009; Rawls, 2002; Gutmannand Thompson, 
1996; Richardson, 2002; Christiano, 1996; Dryzek, 2001). 
The latter are particularly concerned about the material 
restrictions involved in any deliberative process: conditions 
of time and location of the discussions. Consequently, while 
the first group promotes direct participation of citizens 
through procedures of political decentralization, the second 
one stresses the need of reasonable conditions to ensure 
deliberation. 
Despite these differences, those who hold the epistemic 
vision of democracy find the cognitive value of democratic 
procedures in a series of factors that, following Pérez Zafrilla 
(2009), we may summarise as follows: 
a) Deliberation increases available knowledge and reduces 
cognitive asymmetries since it favours information 
exchange on interests and needs of those concerned by 
the decisions. 
b) It permits the expression of individuals’ preferences, 
interests and needs, which allows them to reinterpret 
different stances after listening, understanding and 
interpreting the views of others. 
c) It allows detecting and acknowledging mistakes. 
d) Screening acceptable reasons will allow individuals to 
face their own prejudices and value the opinions of 
others. 
e) Manipulation of information becomes more difficult 
since it enables its distribution, circulation and 
interpretation by a large number of agents. 
f) The inclusion of diverse perspectives implies a greater 
possibility of avoiding cognitive mistakes and biases 
typical of homogeneous situations 
In view of these issues, supporters of deliberative 
democracy hold that it is more probable to arrive at correct 
decisions through processes of public deliberation than 
through processes that admit negotiation, manipulation or 
demagogy. 
Backing these notions, in “Does democracy still have an 
epistemic component?” Habermas (2009) showed that 
several research projects provide empirical proof of the idea 
that political discussions have a cognitive potential. He 
stated that numerous studies based on group discussions, 
which were subjected to measurement and they showed there 
was acquisition and increase of knowledge, proved opinions 
were altered and corrected. Consequently, the difference 
between initial and final discussions may be interpreted as 
the result of learning. 
5. The Capability Approach under the 
Light of Epistemic Proceduralism 
In view of these arguments, Sen’s proposal proves 
interesting: to apply democratic procedures to work out lists 
of capabilities and/or valuable functionings. Not merely in 
order to ensure another kind of legitimacy for 
poverty-measuring instruments, but also for epistemic 
reasons. Sen himself acknowledges the epistemic 
productivity that democratic practice offers to citizens in the 
process of values and priorities formation. As implied in his 
words: “the practice of democracy gives citizens an 
opportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to 
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form its values and priorities. Even the idea of "needs," 
including the understanding of "economic needs," requires 
public discussion and exchange of information, views, and 
analyses” (Sen, 1999: 10). 
Sen also holds that: 
Our conception of needs relates to our ideas of the 
preventable nature of some deprivations and to our 
understanding of what can be done about them. In 
the formation of understandings and beliefs about 
feasibility (particularly, social feasibility), public 
discussions play a crucial role. Political rights, 
including freedom of expression and discussion, 
are not only pivotal in inducing social responses to 
economic needs; they are also central to the 
conceptualization of economic needs themselves 
(Sen, 1999: 11). 
On this issue, Sen highlights the de-naturalising potential 
of public discussion when defining 
needs/capabilities/functionings or valuable life-styles. In 
Sen’s view, discussion and dialogue are indispensable not 
merely to delineate responses (by which he means public 
policies) but also to conceptualise needs. The generative 
process is essential in creating values and may not be seen as 
alien to political debate. This means it does not depend on 
whether interchange and public discussion are allowed or not. 
This proves the performative power of language in the 
definition of ‘necessary’ and ‘valuable’. Along the same line, 
implementing the deliberative paradigm may contribute to 
de-naturalise some situations of extreme deprivation2 -that 
may lead to a defensive adaptation of expectations- and 
consequently posit new valuable lifestyles that would have 
been unthinkable without public interchange3. 
Along the same line as Sen, Sandel states that in public 
deliberative situations a cognitive agency is developed that 
creates a reflexive distance related to individual and social 
features. Those features are determined by historical 
identities, traditions and habits. This allows the “I” to focus 
on itself, research in its constitutive nature, its various links 
and acknowledge its demands, until it attains a less opaque 
self-understanding. This understanding is never fully 
transparent, the idea is to keep participating gradually in 
constituting one’s identity (Sandel, 2000). 
On the other hand, deliberative spaces create horizons 
where it is possible to cope with “adaptive preferences” 
(Elster, 1998), viz., preferences formed unconsciously in the 
face of the difference between possibilities and desires. This 
process is also known as “sour grapes” in reference to La 
                                                          
2 Sen mentions the case of the Indian state of Kerala, where there was a 
decline of fertility rates through the emergence of new values, a process in 
which political and social dialogue played a key role (Sen, 1999). 
3 The absence of public interchange may be connected to the notion of 
isolation described by Arendt. Such situation cancels the possibility of 
working together in the political sphere and this annuls the capacity of action 
that is possible in the public space. In this sense, Arendt holds that isolated 
men lose freedom, they lack a common project and they can only preserve 
their public life (2008). 
Fontaine’s fable about the fox and the grapes. The fox wishes 
to eat some grapes that she could not reach. After several 
failed trials she comes to the conclusion that she does not 
mind not reaching them because they were surely sour. As 
happens in the fable, adaptive preferences are characterised 
by the development of unconscious strategies that avoid or 
diminish frustration that might ensue from cognitive 
dissonance, which occurs when some needs or desires cannot 
be fulfilled (Pereira, 2007). 
In Sen’s view, sticking to a fixed list and not creating 
deliberative spaces to select a list would somehow mean 
adapting to deprivations. If agents are asked separately about 
what they deem is a valuable life, they are denied the 
possibility of progress in social understanding and those 
instruments are deprived of the wealth that public discussion 
might provide.4 
What has been said so far proves that Sen’s critique is not 
opposed to the lists themselves; rather it targets their 
reification, the fact that they arise exclusively from experts’ 
voices, with no submission to public reasoning. He disagrees 
with depriving them of the cognitive potential that they 
might receive as a result of the participation of an array of 
voices in the definition of what should be included in a list, 
and why. 
This is a crucial point that indicates the connection 
between epistemic proceduralism and Sen’s proposal. 
Whereas Development and Freedom exhibits concern about 
the procedural issue –basically, concern to grant legitimacy 
to poverty-measurement instruments- other works 
demonstrate that such legitimacy does not rest exclusively on 
ensuring a legitimate process, but on the cognitive sphere 
added by public debate. 
The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but 
with insisting on one predetermined canonical list of 
capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social 
discussion or public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, 
emanating entirely from pure theory, is to deny the 
possibility of fruitful public participation on what should be 
included and why (Sen, 2004: 77). 
What I am against is the fixing of a cemented list of 
capabilities, which is absolutely complete (nothing 
could be added to it) and totally fixed (it could not 
respond to public reasoning and to the formation of 
social values). (…) But pure theory cannot 
‘‘freeze’’ a list of capabilities for all societies for 
all time to come, irrespective of what the citizens 
come to understand and value. That would be not 
only a denial of the reach of democracy, but also a 
misunderstanding of what pure theory can do, 
completely divorced from the particular social 
reality that any particular society faces (Sen, 2004: 
77). 
                                                          
4 “to insist in a fixed forever list of capabilities would deny the possibility 
of progress in social understanding and also go against the productive role of 
public discussion, social agitation, and open debates” (Sen, 2004: 80) 
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As can be gathered from what has been observed up to 
here, in works as Development and Freedom (2000) Sen 
seems to place procedural virtues above epistemic ones, 
stressing the advantages of employing tools legitimized by 
the fact that the agents under study were involved as opposed 
to the exclusive involvement of “experts”. Somehow, Sen 
seems willing to renounce to some epistemic component or 
pattern because he fears to fall into technocratic stances. That 
alleged relinquishment, however, must be interpreted as a 
question. The question posed by Sen is the following: how to 
democratize the process of devising instruments to measure 
capabilities, not underestimating expert knowledge and 
presuming the democratic procedure displays enough 
epistemic value as to justify those strategies. 
This presumed inclination in favour of the procedural 
issue at the expense of the epistemic value witnessed in 
Development and Freedom (Sen, 2000), reappears in other 
works such as Democracy as a Universal Value (1999), or in 
articles as “Dialogue, capabilities lists, and public reason: 
continuing the conversation”(2004) that witness to the 
compatibility between procedural and epistemic value in 
democratic decisions. They also emphasize the relevance of 
public deliberation at the cognitive level when some need or 
any kind of valuable life must be defined. 
5.1. Capabilities and Rights 
Within the context provided by arguments that attribute 
procedural and epistemic value to democratic decisions it is 
fitting to ask what contribution –if any- the capabilities 
approach can make to the grounding of human rights. 
When discussing the rights that shape citizenship, some 
thinkers distinguish between first generation rights (civil and 
political) and second generation ones) economic, social and 
cultural). We agree with Sen, however, that full 
implementation of civil and political rights is unattainable 
within a framework of non-fulfilment of economic, social 
and cultural rights. All human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent, and interrelated (Vienna 
Declaration: World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 
1993). Consequently, it proves impossible to establish a 
hierarchy of rights or leave out some rights in order to 
promote others. Contrariwise, specifying the reach of 
economic, social and cultural rights is a key tool for 
empowerment and implementation of civil and political 
rights. That is why it is important to devise strategies for 
participatory measurements that will open the way to define 
lists of capabilities that allow to gauge the reach of civil and 
political rights as well as economic, social and cultural ones. 
“Both the understanding of human rights and of the 
adequacy of a list of basic capabilities, I would argue, are 
intimately linked with the reach of public discussion – 
between persons and across borders. The viability and 
universality of human rights and of an acceptable 
specification of capabilities are dependent on their ability to 
survive open critical scrutiny in public reasoning” (Sen 2005: 
163). 
Along this line, the inclusion in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of “a far wider list of freedoms and 
recognitions, which besides including basic political rights, 
adds the right to work, to education, protection from 
unemployment and poverty, the right to trade-union 
association and even the right to a fair salary (…) is a radical 
step forward compared to the narrow scope of the American 
Declaration, 1776 and the French Declaration, 1789” (Sen, 
2011: 412). 
5.2. Towards an Acknowledgment of Obstacles 
Acknowledging both the virtues of deliberative 
democracy and the possibility of transferring them to the 
design of a list of capabilities, following democratic 
procedures does not mean such processes are free from 
difficulties. 
One of the greatest obstacles encountered by this 
paradigm is caused by differences in abilities or competence 
at expression among participants in deliberations to argue 
and defend their stances. It is a demanding type of 
communication and some critics hold that it may reproduce 
inequalities (Mansbridge, 1992). In view of this problem, 
Habermas states that arguing is connected to daily routines of 
providing and demanding reasons. He claims that in 
everyday communication agents already move among 
reasons, clear up validity assertions, learn from each other 
and solve problems since in the very act of expecting to be 
understood about something “they cannot avoid mutually 
expounding claims of validity for their assertions” 
(Habermas, 2009: 145). 
The ideal of deliberative democracy requires including 
everybody under conditions of freedom and equity; 
consequently, it intends to ensure that those in situations of 
asymmetries of power can voice their opinion. It is worth 
noting that it is not the rules of discourse that spell 
disadvantage for the weakest; it is incumbent powers that 
devise asymmetrical and unequal relationships in social life 
(Reigadas, 2010). Consequently, acknowledging the 
difficulties involved in guaranteeing equal conditions in 
public debates does not imply conferring ontological 
symmetry to reality and discourse. Discourse constitutes a 
normative instance through which reality may be judged. If 
discourse proves emancipatory it is precisely because it 
admits leaving a situation in particular and imagining other 
settings, thus fostering the chance of critiquing even the 
conditions in which the very discourse is produced. 
Applying it to the definition and eventual delineation of 
capabilities lists it would prove necessary to produce spaces 
of deliberation where experts can neutralize such differences. 
Since although, as alleged by Habermas (2009), they are 
daily communication practices, these usually are 
symmetrical situations where people provide and require 
reasons from each other. As is well known, deliberation 
conditions are not guaranteed. Differences as to discursive 
competence happen against a backdrop of differences in life 
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experiences and the epistemic wealth of deliberation is 
caused by the possibility of having access to such 
experiences in public exchanges. 
Another obstacle of the epistemic notion of democracy 
lies in the cognitive differences between citizens. This poses 
a couple of problems: one of them is connected to the level of 
wisdom of each person. It might be deemed convenient to let 
the wisest persons make the necessary decisions or, in the 
case of capabilities list to evaluate wellbeing, leave them 
exclusively in charge of experts. Nevertheless, as maintained 
by Estlund (2011) in reference to deliberative democracy, 
there is no guarantee that sages will not privilege their own 
benefits in detriment of the common good. In that case, if 
decisions were left in the hands of this sort of aristocracy of 
sages' dangers would outstrip benefits. 
The unfeasibility of reaching consensus is yet another 
hindrance. Authors who focus on deliberative processes have 
amply foreseen this problem. When people argue and 
expound their stances about what they deem fair, they 
seldom come to an agreement and even when they manage to 
do so, agreements are not always final; they may later prove 
more inclusive and based on better reasons (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996; Bohman, 1997; Richardson, 2002; Estlund, 
2011).  
Problems connected to the unfeasibility of reaching 
consensus in general move over to the capability approach 
and pose an array of questions: How to build consensuses 
about what should be measured? If we assume that this kind 
of measurements leads toward devising better social policies, 
what happens if it proves impossible to agree on a list of 
capabilities? How valid would each list be in view of the fact 
that the consensus reached is not definite? Must we give up 
the possibility of comparing poverty conditions if we have 
different lists? 
Based on what we have just said, if no consensus is 
reached and having to admit that one’s position did not win, 
Estlund (2011) argues that, as opposed to groups of experts 
or specialists, the democratic process is invested with an 
epistemic value that may be generally accepted by qualified 
opinion, without demanding to forsake one’s own judgement. 
This would avoid the issue of rectification, which implies 
one owns he was mistaken if one’s opinions do not coincide 
with the results of agreements that were democratically 
arrived at. 
Lastly, if the capability approach may be articulated with 
epistemic proceduralism, it is appropriate to ask: What 
epistemic value would we demand from public deliberation 
when devising a list of capabilities with which to assess 
situations of deprivation? Where would we place its 
cognitive value? In participation (as held by some supporters 
of deliberative democracy), or should epistemic value rest on 
deliberation conditions? The former, which holds that the 
more individuals who participate there is a larger chance of 
reaching correct decisions, does not seem appropriate 
because the number of participants does not guarantee the 
quality of deliberation and the knowledge generated by these 
processes is given by the quality of deliberation. The choice 
seems to be the latter; in that case, the issue will be to sustain 
epistemic justification, even under non-ideal conditions. 
These hurdles that must be overcome by deliberation 
processes, compounded by the material restrictions typical of 
every deliberative process –that is, conditioning aspects 
related to time and location of discussions- require that we 
continue exploring the connection between democratic 
processes and the capability approach. It proves essential to 
reach a balance point between proceduralism and epistemic 
virtues if we expect to make a significant contribution within 
poverty-studies. 
6. Conclusions 
Reconstructing the general guidelines of Sen’s perspective, 
which proposes to delineate capability lists of democratic 
procedures that involve agents whose wellbeing will be 
measured, with no prior prescription, allowed us to confirm 
that this perspective shares the basic viewpoints of 
approaches which support the epistemic value of democracy. 
This link, as we noticed above, has moved within Sen’s 
work from a stance that highlighted concern for the 
legitimacy of measuring instruments, granting further value 
to the democratic participation of the agents, to another 
stance that makes room for compatibility between the 
procedural and the epistemic fields. 
In fact, Sen assigns cognitive virtues to deliberation at 
various levels: on one hand, in a practical dimension because 
meeting others enables denaturalisation of situations, habits 
and routines that restrict and limit agents’ autonomy and 
facilitates widening knowledge about rights and, 
consequently, about the conditions for exercising citizenship. 
On the other hand, on theoretical and methodological levels 
since such processes open the way for redefining the 
valuable and making it measurable. 
As shown up to here, the most obvious links between the 
capability approach and epistemic proceduralism belong in 
the theoretical level. The challenge for those studying 
poverty and social needs lies in effectively applying the 
current ideal notion of deliberative democracy to the 
definition of needs or capabilities lists which, in turn, provide 
solid arguments for grounding rights. Without doubt, the 
challenge is to democratise the process of defining valuable 
life styles, opening new links between experts and civil 
society with the purpose of creating new deliberation spaces 
where restrictions of time and location of discussions typical 
of any deliberation process may be faced and solved, while 
simultaneously expanding the boundaries of citizenship. 
Citizen activity constitutes the substance of democratic 
politics. Its implementation would prove impossible in the 
absence of an institutional device. Such device, however, is 
dynamic and subject to transformations. Some of the latter 
may respond to pressure by citizen groups that, somehow, 
“push” the limits that define the conditions for belonging to a 
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society and, in the process, outline the enlargement of rights 
to democracy. 
The epistemic value of deliberation depends on the 
existence of a framework where everyone can express 
him/herself. It is only within such framework that 
experiences and needs of others can be understood, where 
each person’s experiences may be denaturalised and 
re-signified. This will permit a novel definition of both needs 
and capabilities. In this sense, the results of deliberative 
processes are never impervious to the reality of their 
participants. Deliberation implies comprehension, shifting to 
the situation of others preserving particularity without 
self-effacement, but permitting interpellation. Given these 
conditions, deliberation may be seen as broadening freedoms, 
transforming and liberating subjects. 
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